



IEC 63096

Edition 1.0 2020-10

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD



**Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation, control and electrical power systems –
Security controls**





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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS –
INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS –
SECURITY CONTROLS**

FOREWORD

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International Standard IEC 63096 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation, control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear instrumentation.

The text of this standard is based on the following documents:

FDIS	Report on voting
45A/1346/FDIS	45A/1353/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

This document is based on ISO/IEC 27002:2013.

Clause 5 through Clause 18 of this document follow ISO/IEC 27002:2013, Clause 5 through Clause 18.

The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "<http://webstore.iec.ch>" in the data related to the specific document. At this date, the document will be

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INTRODUCTION

a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the Standard

For I&C systems in nuclear power plants this IEC standard specifically focuses on the selection and application of security controls from the included security controls catalogue, in order to prevent, detect and react to cyberattacks against computer based I&C systems.

This standard applies to all Nuclear I&C programmable digital systems throughout the life cycle of the system. It may also be applicable to other types of nuclear facilities. It applies to the I&C programmable digital systems of new nuclear power plants and to the modernization or modification of I&C Programmable Digital Systems in existing plants. It was prepared and based on IEC 62645 and ISO/IEC 27002, IAEA and country specific guidance in this expanding technical and security focus area.

It is intended that this International Standard be used by designers and operators of NPPs (utilities), systems evaluators, vendors and subcontractors, and by licensors.

b) Situation of the current Standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series

This standard (IEC 63096) is a third level IEC SC 45A document tackling the generic issue of cybersecurity controls and supplements IEC 62645 with more details on security controls.

IEC 62645 is considered formally as a second level document with respect to IEC 61513. IEC 62645 is the top-level document with respect to cybersecurity in the SC 45A standard series.

For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this introduction.

c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this standard

It is important to note that this standard establishes additional cybersecurity related requirements for I&C systems with regard to the I&C platform and I&C system functionality and the environments for the development of I&C platforms and the engineering, installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance of I&C systems in nuclear power plants.

Aspects for which special requirements and recommendations have been produced are:

- IAEA guidance on computer security at nuclear facilities
- ISO/IEC series on Information Security Management Systems (ISMS)
- Regulatory interpretations for country specific requirements for countries participating in this project.

It is recognized that this is an evolving area of regulatory requirements, due to the changing and evolving nature of computer security threats.

It is also recognized that products derived from application of this subject matter require protection. Release of the standard's country specific requirements should be controlled to limit the extent to which organizations or individuals intending to access nuclear power plant systems illegally, improperly or without authorization may benefit from this information.

d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships with other IEC documents and other bodies' documents (IAEA, ISO)

The top-level documents of the IEC SC 45A standard series are IEC 61513 and IEC 63046.

IEC 61513 provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions important to safety in NPPs.

IEC 63046 provides general requirements for electrical power systems of NPPs; it covers power supply systems including the supply of the I&C systems.

IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 are to be considered in conjunction and at the same level. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 structure the IEC SC 45A standard series and shape a complete framework establishing general requirements for instrumentation, control and electrical systems for nuclear power plants.

IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation, defence against common cause failure, control room design, electromagnetic compatibility, cybersecurity, software and hardware aspects for programmable digital systems, coordination of safety and security requirements and management of ageing.

The standards referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 as a consistent document set.

At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 or by IEC 63046 are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be used on their own.

A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45 standard series, corresponds to the Technical Reports which are not normative.

IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 have adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication IEC 61508 with an overall life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework. Regarding nuclear safety, IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 provide the interpretation of the general requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector. In this framework IEC 60880, IEC 62138 and IEC 62566 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R part 2 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA). At level 2, regarding nuclear security, IEC 62645 is the entry document for the IEC/SC 45A security standards. It builds upon the valid high-level principles and main concepts of the generic security standards, in particular ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002; it adapts them and completes them to fit the nuclear context and coordinates with the IEC 62443 series. At level 2, IEC 60964 is the entry document for the IEC/SC 45A control rooms standards and IEC 62342 is the entry document for the ageing management standards.

The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the safety and security principles and basic aspects provided in the relevant IAEA safety standards and in the relevant documents of the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS). In particular this includes the IAEA requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of nuclear power plants (NPPs), the IAEA safety guide SSG-30 dealing with the safety classification of structures, systems and components in NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-39 dealing with the design of instrumentation and control systems for NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-34 dealing with the design of electrical power systems for NPPs and the implementing guide NSS17 for computer security at nuclear facilities. The safety and security terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.

NOTE 1 It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions (e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or national standards would be applied, that are based on the requirements of a standard such as IEC 61508.

NOTE 2 IEC/SC 45A domain was extended in 2013 to cover electrical systems. In 2014 and 2015 discussions were held in IEC/SC 45A to decide how and where general requirements for the design of electrical systems were to be considered. IEC/SC 45A experts recommended that an independent standard be developed at the same level as IEC 61513 to establish general requirements for electrical systems. Project IEC 63046 is now launched to cover this objective. When IEC 63046 is published, this Note 2 of the introduction of IEC/SC 45A standards will be suppressed.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS – SECURITY CONTROLS

1 Scope

1.1 General

Since strict requirements on safety and availability of nuclear I&C apply, due consideration of cybersecurity threats is needed.

Since nowadays nuclear I&C programmable digital systems are largely based on digital systems including networks, individual I&C systems are more and more interconnected, and the I&C equipment is widely spread within the NPP area, security controls for prevention, detection and correction are needed to protect nuclear I&C programmable digital systems from external and internal cybersecurity threats.

The objective of this document is to extend the SC 45A series of documents addressing cybersecurity with IEC 62645 as its top-level document, by defining nuclear I&C programmable digital system specific security controls for I&C systems of the Safety Classes 1, 2, 3 and for non-classified (NC) I&C systems. The safety classification of I&C systems, and associated safety requirements, are among the biggest differences compared to typical IT systems and standard industrial automation systems. Annex B contains a correspondence between IEC 62645 and IEC 63096.

This document, based on the security controls defined in ISO/IEC 27002, reflects the special security control requirements for nuclear I&C programmable digital systems. The original ISO/IEC 27002 requirements are either modified, detailed or completed, wherever deemed necessary from a nuclear I&C programmable digital system perspective. Additional nuclear I&C programmable digital system specific security controls that are not identified in ISO/IEC 27002, but deemed necessary are also added.

This document refers in detail to ISO/IEC 27002:2013. A later modification of ISO/IEC 27002:2013 will not automatically influence the modifications, detailing and completions given by IEC 63096 without analysing the consequences from the nuclear I&C perspective.

By applying and extending the ISO/IEC 27002:2013 security controls, this document implicitly reflects all lifecycle phases of nuclear I&C programmable digital system platforms and systems.

By selecting the highly recommended security controls based on the processes as defined in IEC 62645 and the additional process details described within this document the risk level will be reduced to an acceptable level.

The selection of security controls ensures that both safety and security requirements are met according to IEC 62859. If a specific security control negatively influences safety, safety prevails (see IEC 62859) and a compensatory security control should be implemented.

For the development of this document ISO/IEC 27009 has been followed as far as applicable, also considering that ISO/IEC 27009 is not binding for the SC 45A IEC standard series.

ISO/IEC 27019 explicitly excludes the “process control domain of nuclear facilities”.